by David
Phinney
April 5th, 2004
Ken
Pedeleose’s eyes popped in awe as he plowed through a bill
for airplane parts in 1999: $2,522 for a 4½-inch metal
sleeve, $744 for a washer, $714 for a rivet, and $5,217 for
a 1-inch metal bracket.
The senior
industrial engineer, working for the Defense Contract
Management Agency in Marietta, Ga., had wrestled for more
than a year with a Lockheed Martin subsidiary over what he
considered to be inflated pricing of spare parts for the Air
Force’s C-5 transport plane.
"It was a
nightmare,” Pedeleose now recalls. “I kept asking for
information to justify the pricing, and I would just get
stonewalled.”
So Pedeleose took
his concerns to the Defense Criminal Investigative Service,
which concluded, in a November 2001 report, that
Lockheed’s prices were “based on cost and pricing data
that was known to be false and purposely overstated.”
Now, five years
after Lockheed submitted its bill for those C-5 parts, the
DoD inspector general has weighed in with a recommendation
for more vigilance by Defense auditors, a powerful senator
has joined the fight to cut the spare parts prices, and
Lockheed and the Air Force still have not settled on a fair,
final price for hundreds of spare parts.
A Lockheed
official, who asked that his name be withheld, declined to
detail how the prices were set but did say the company and
the Pentagon have agreed that further payments for those C-5
parts are still due; the question of how much those payments
will be, however, “remains to be negotiated.” The
Lockheed official declined to discuss further the C-5
program.
For Pedeleose and
other auditors, this episode reflects the dark side of
acquisition reforms put in place by Congress in the past
decade.
The reforms are
widely credited with making government purchases of goods
and services easier, faster and, in many cases, cheaper.
They have allowed the Pentagon to buy more commercial,
off-the-shelf items instead of expensive custom solutions
designed from scratch. And they have given contracting
officers more ways to buy products and services, including
through the use of pre-existing governmentwide contracts.
But the reforms
also have spawned new varieties of contracts that may be too
big and complex to effectively manage and oversee —
especially because federal contracting and auditing staffs
have been cut in half since the end of the Cold War.
This reduction in
force, Pedeleose and others say, has made it more difficult
for contract auditors to do their jobs while making it
increasingly tempting for companies to inflate their prices.
Despite these
well-documented problems, it is now routine practice for the
Pentagon to award multibillion-dollar contracts to provide,
for example, soup-to-nuts logistics support for an entire
weapon system or a host of support services for U.S. troops
deployed in an overseas operation.
Such
indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contracts
and virtual prime vendor (VPV) contracts are now stealing
headlines in Iraq, where Halliburton
is alleged to have overcharged the government for fuel and
meals supplied to U.S. troops.
Other prime
contractors in Iraq are under similar scrutiny by Pentagon
auditors. Titan Corp., Fluor Federal Systems, Perini,
Washington Group International and others have failed
to produce cost and pricing data to justify billings to the
government as required by law.
“There are a lot
of reforms that are right, but there is also a lot of sloppy
implementation,” said Steven Schooner, a former
acquisition official at the Office of Management and Budget
who is now co-director of the Government Procurement Law
Program at the George Washington University Law School.
Not enough
auditors?
For contracting
officers like Pedeleose, trying to square contractors’
prices can be a major slog. The real costs incurred by
contractors for services, goods, deliveries and warehousing
can be obfuscated by impenetrable contractual jargon or
claimed by contractors to be proprietary, Pedeleose and
other auditors complain.
Understaffed
auditing agencies now must pick and choose more selectively
where they point their magnifying glass. The Defense
Contract Audit Agency, the inspector general’s office and
the Justice Department do catch some abuses, but there
aren’t enough auditors to do a full and thorough check.
Says Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif.: “There are few
mechanisms in place to prevent overcharges from occurring in
the first place.”
Once contractors
secure a large contract, Waxman said, it becomes a monopoly.
“The more a contractor bills, the more money the
contractor makes.”
Danielle Brian,
executive director of the watchdog group Project on
Government Oversight, agrees, saying these mammoth IDIQ
contracts and other procurement reforms cede too much
control to prime contractors, which have little or no
incentive to contain costs. They also limit the ability of
smaller firms to compete for government business, she said.
“It should come
as no surprise that companies are exploiting their
government contracts,” she said.
The case of the
C-5 parts
The parts Pedeleose
found to be overpriced in 1999 are still under negotiation:
Almost 400 remain in dispute.
For example,
Lockheed produced and sold to the Pentagon 219 1-inch metal
brackets called clip strut support vapor barriers. Lockheed
proposed charging $5,217.91 per bracket. This price was
based on the premise that each bracket was producd in
single-item lots, with each lot assuming the costs of
setting up, tooling, manufacturing, overhead costs, profits
and other factors. The Defense Criminal Investigative
Service found later that this was untrue: The brackets were
produced in lots of larger quantities, and Lockheed knew
this.
But DCMA rejected
that price and, after careful analysis, said a fair cost was
$258.90 per bracket. This price was based on Lockheed’s
own data, pricing methods and scales of economy, as well as
historical data of previous purchases.
The final price is
still in dispute; the Pentagon agreed in September 2000 to
pay $1.05 in materials costs for each bracket until
negotiations on a final price conclude. When Pedeleose
discovered those highly priced parts in 1999, it was not the
first time.
Just a year before
— in 1998 — he had wrestled with Lockheed over pricing
for the very same parts. That struggle resulted in
government savings of $34 million, according to DCMA
estimates.
When he again
discovered suspiciously high prices on the same C-5 parts in
1999, Defense Logistics Agency officials were actively
negotiating a sole-source, virtual-prime-vendor contract
with Lockheed to provide management and logistics support
for 11,000 C-5 spare parts.
The deal was signed
in December 2000.
As the single
source and broker for the parts, Lockheed was expected to
apply modern commercial logistics technology and processes
to anticipate the Air Force’s needs for spare parts and
coordinate with scores of subcontractors to make sure they
were delivered just in time.
But the three-year
contract was canceled by the Defense Logistics Agency in
summer 2002 after only 19 months and a cost of $89 million.
“It doesn’t do
any good to go into any of the problems,” said DLA legal
counsel Lenny Rogers in Richmond, Va. “We weren’t
getting what we anticipated and saw a different route to
go.”
Rogers admitted the
contract proved too big and unwieldly to manage for the
department. Instead, DLA hired nearly a dozen parts
suppliers and kept the overall management chores to itself.
“To price 11,000
items is not the smartest thing,” Rogers said. “But if
you can get 100 or 50 items at a time, it’s much easier to
handle the pricing negotiation. That’s the evolution we
went through.”
A Lockheed
official, in a written statement, characterized the
company’s performance on the C-5 virtual prime vendor
contract as “good.”
The contract “was
the first supply chain management approach for an entire
military weapon system,” the statement said. “It was a
significant task and change in approach for the government.
We believe the DLA simply chose another path to support the
C-5. We respect our customers’ right to decide how their
weapon systems are supported.”
Senator calls
for investigation
In 2002, Pedeleose
compiled and sent to Congress a 90-page report entitled
“Criminal Vulnerability and Fraud,” that claims DCMA and
other Defense officials repeatedly ignored his warnings that
contractors may be overcharging the Pentagon on the C-5, the
F/A-22 fighter and the C-130J transport programs.
Sen. Charles
Grassley, R-Iowa, the chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, has called on the Defense Department Inspector
General’s office to launch a series of investigations into
whether Lockheed purposefully used false information to
justify excessive prices for the C-5 parts.
That IG
investigation is still ongoing, but already Grassley is
taking the Defense auditing community to task for failing to
get to the bottom of whether Lockheed willfully attempted to
overcharge the Pentagon for the C-5 parts, as the Defense
Criminal Investigative Service concluded in 2001.
DoD IG Joe
Schmitz’s report, issued on Feb. 23, failed to explore
DCIS’ findings that Lockheed used false pricing data. But
Schmitz called on DCMA and another auditing agency, the
Defense Contract Audit Agency, to “maintain vigilance
until the price for the remaining parts is negotiated.”
Grassley was
unimpressed. In a Feb. 24 letter to Schmitz, he derided the
report as “weak and incomplete” and said the IG’s
recommendation for continued vigilance fell short of what
was needed.
“That conclusion
is truly weak,” Grassley told Schmitz. “Those two
entities [DCMA and DCAA] have a long-standing reputation for
turning a blind eye to contractor rip-offs. They are not
known for being vicious junkyard dogs when it comes to
protecting the taxpayers’ money.”
After six years of
fighting over the prices with Lockheed and pushing his
managers to act, Pedeleose said he couldn’t agree more.
“The IG ignored
its own [DCIS] investigators that found there was fraud in
2001,” said Pedeleose, who believes he has ruined his
career and lost any chance for promotion because of his
fight over the C-5 parts. “Fraud is staring them in the
face, and nothing is done to stop it. Urging continued
vigilance is mush.”
Equally
disconcerting is the feeling that other auditors may choose
not to fight the way he has.
“How
many other contracts are treated this way?” Pedeleose
asks. “How many other times does this happen?” |