Poor Planning for Iraq Contractor

Poor planning blamed on Halliburton's KBR unit in Iraq: Defense News, Federal Times, Army Times and Gannett ((July 26, 2004). One of many news stories on the coming storm of unforeseen consequences in the reliance on contractors in Iraq.

 

By DAVID PHINNEY

Poor planning by the Army before the invasion of Iraq led to recurring problems with a multibillion-dollar contract for military support services, says a congressional report.

Executives with the support services contractor -- Halliburton subsidiary KBR, formerly known as Kellogg Brown & Root -- defended the company’s performance at a hearing the day after the July 21 report was released. But former employees who had worked in Iraq and Kuwait testified the company engaged in reckless spending and sloppy accounting methods that led to frequent overcharges to the government.

Released by the investigative arm of Congress, the Government Accountability Office, formerly the General Accounting Office, the report singled out numerous problems with Halliburton’s work in providing services to U.S. troops deployed in Iraq that, in part, stemmed from ineffective planning before the war followed by a “piecemeal” plan after the fall of Baghdad in May 2003.

Under the massive, 10-year contract, known as the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, or LOGCAP, KBR is expected to deploy anywhere in the world and provide the military with food, housing, camp maintenance and transportation of supplies.

The Army and Defense Department share in the blame for the problems KBR faces because of poor advance planning, the report said. “The Army Central Command did not develop plans to use the contract to support its military forces in Iraq until May 2003, even though Army’s LOGCAP guidance calls for early planning and early involvement of the contractor,” the report said.

The lack of foresight led to frequent changes in work orders by the Army. From September 2002 through December 2003, the task orders for troop support in Kuwait changed 18 times, while the work order in Iraq changed seven times, the report said. That, in turn, would cause abrupt changes in what was expected from the company.

Recurring contractor problems such as poor cost reporting, difficulties with meeting schedules, and weak oversight of purchasing also made the LOGCAP contract more difficult to administer.

“A more deliberate approach” would have yielded “a better product at a lower cost,” GAO said.

GAO echoes other government investigations, faulting Halliburton for staffing problems, an antiquated accounting system, inaccurate cost estimates, improper records for billing, and work that frequently missed schedules.

At the July 22 hearing before the House Government Reform Committee, Halliburton executives reminded lawmakers that their employees are under attack every day in Iraq . Forty-two KBR workers have lost their lives, another 93 have been wounded and others have been kidnapped, Alfred Neffgen, KBR chief operating officer for government operations, told the committee.

“In these conditions the military assigned us jobs like bringing in millions of gallons of fuel for the military, feeding the troops and transporting critical military supplies,” Neffgen said. “We are accomplishing this mission.”

Three former KBR employees who also testified told a different story. They accused company managers of rarely performing oversight of subcontractors and being ill-prepared for providing logistical support on such a large scale.

Assigned to LOGCAP in Kuwait, former Army Capt. Marie deYoung said she was tasked with bringing expired subcontracts up to date and was asked to address other problems that made it difficult to provide services to the troops.

Four months after taking the job in December 2003, she concluded that poor contracting skills were evident in every phase of the company’s work. Laundry services were contracted for $100 per 15-pound bag and Halliburton staff was staying in Kuwait ’s five-star Kempinski hotel, she said.

“It’s not surprising that I observed significant waste and overpricing,” deYoung said. “I tried to correct some of these practices, but the Halliburton corporate culture is one of intimidation and fear.”

A former truck convoy commander in Iraq , David Wilson, complained that KBR ignored basic maintenance of Volvo and Mercedes trucks. Vehicles with a flat tire or other minor failure were regularly abandoned or torched at the side of the road.

KBR executives said that laundry needs for the troops were initially overestimated and that a contract was quickly renegotiated.

“KBR takes seriously the matters of controlling costs,” said William Walter, KBR director of government compliance. “We are proud of our record as a federal contractor.”

KBR regional project manager for transportation in Iraq , Keith Richard, said that abandoning trucks was a decision made by the Army.

“The Army, not KBR, makes all decisions regarding whether to halt a convoy to fix a truck or to abandon it,” he said. “Those judgments are made on an assessment of how to save lives.”

 

 
 
 
 
 
 

Website Created by Red Dot Creative Media

All rights reserved. Reproduction without permission is strictly prohibited.

Copyright 2005,  David Phinney